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Abstract
Déjà vu and tip-of-the-tongue (TOT) are retrieval-related subjective experiences whose
study relies on participant self-report. In four experiments (ns = 224, 273, 123 and 154), we
explored the effect of questioning method on reported occurrence of déjà vu and TOT in
experimental settings. All participants carried out a continuous recognition task, which was
not expected to induce déjà vu or TOT, but were asked about their experiences of these
subjective states. When presented with contemporary definitions, between 32% and 58% of
participants nonetheless reported experiencing déjà vu or TOT. Changing the definition of
déjà vu or asking participants to bring to mind a real-life instance of déjà vu or TOT before
completing the recognition task had no impact on reporting rates. However, there was an
indication that changing the method of requesting subjective reports impacted reporting of
both experiences. More specifically, moving from the commonly used retrospective ques-
tioning (e.g. “Have you experienced déjà vu?”) to free report instructions (e.g. “Indicate
whenever you experience déjà vu.”) reduced the total number of reported déjà vu and TOT
occurrences. We suggest that research on subjective experiences should move toward free
report assessments. Such a shift would potentially reduce the presence of false alarms in
experimental work, thereby reducing the overestimation of subjective experiences prevalent
in this area of research.
Introduction
Tip of the tongue (TOT) and déjà vu are both subjective experiences of a temporary malfunc-
tion in the cognitive system. They are similar in that both are thought to arise from unsuccess-
ful or partial retrieval alongside a metacognitive appraisal of this retrieval failure as jarring.
More precisely, TOT is the inability to recall a piece of information combined with an aware-
ness that this information ought to be accessible [1] whereas déjà vu is familiarity with an epi-
sode, coupled with the awareness that this familiarity is misplaced and the episode is novel [2].
Whereas these two experiences are similar in some regards, they concern different retrieval
mechanisms and are characterized by fundamentally distinctive features.
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A shared challenge for déjà vu and TOT research is the lack of a diagnostic, objective mea-
sure for the experience. Researchers are thus solely reliant on self-reports in order to establish
whether and how often these states have been experienced, and to test critical theories about
the underlying mechanisms. These reports can either be elicited after the experiment in the
form of a post-experimental questionnaire [3] or during the study on a trial-by-trial basis (e.g.
[4]). While these methods differ in frequency of questioning and the temporal range they
cover, both are forms of retrospective questioning and take, in essence, the same form of a yes/
no eliciting question; “During the experiment/on the last trial, did you experience déjà vu/
TOT?”.
One worry is that self-reports are unreliable, and therefore contribute to results which are
limited in their capacity to inform theories of subjective experiences and their prevalence.
Experimental participants are not merely passive respondents; they are often motivated to con-
firm what they perceive as the experimental hypothesis [5] and try to be relevant by focusing
their reports on what they believe the experimenter is interested in [6,7]. This is likely true for
any experiment but it has also been suggested it might be a fundamental problem for research
on subjective mnemonic experiences as a result of limitations in current methods [2].
For example, it was observed that the rate of reported TOT experiences for answers to gen-
eral knowledge questions increased when participants were told the questions were easy as
compared to when they were told they were difficult [8]. The authors of the study interpreted
this finding as a social desirability effect with participants wanting to appear knowledgeable.
This suggests that expectations in regard to the task can lead to changes in participants’ report-
ing, independent of what participants are experiencing. Related to this is the observation that
déjà vu studies often observe high déjà vu reporting on control trials not meant to induce the
experience. One study, across two experiments, observed déjà vu reports in 17% and 26% of
critical trials as compared to 13% and 23% of control trials, indicative of a procedure, which
can reliably generate déjà vu [9]. However, the difference between déjà vu reports on critical
and control trials, while significant, is surprisingly small. One must ask what else about the
experimental paradigm might have led to reports of déjà vu on the control trials and how this
might have influenced déjà vu reports on the critical trials. If participants interpreted déjà vu
merely as a sense of familiarity then a familiarity manipulation would increase déjà vu report-
ing on critical trials without necessarily probing déjà vu. This is supported by a recent study,
which asked participants to elaborate on the nature of their self-reported, experimentally-gen-
erated déjà vu experiences; some participants expressed uncertainty as to whether what they
reported during the experiment was genuine déjà vu [10]. Corroborating self-reports is not
common practice but this finding suggests it should be.
It is evident that déjà vu and TOT, by their nature, necessitate a reliance on self-report both
when their incidence is assessed in real-life and in the laboratory. While this is not in itself a
problem, the research discussed above suggests that self-reports are sensitive to subtle sources
of contamination. The aim of this study is to explore whether there are methods of framing
questions aimed at eliciting self-reports about subjective memory experiences that might be
more reliable than the prevailing approach. The main focus is on the reduction of so-called
false alarms: affirmative responding in the absence of the studied phenomenon.
We have identified two mechanisms by which false alarms might occur. First, participants
might interpret being asked about whether they are experiencing déjà vu or TOT as indicative
of a normative experience that they should be experiencing. This would be especially the case
with a participant who is unsure of what exactly she is experiencing: she might conclude that
her current state is that which the experimenter is interested in, and respond affirmatively
when asked. This is analogous to an acquiescence effect or positive responding regardless of
question content [11]. Alternatively, it could be that the communication between the
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experimenter and participants about the exact nature of the studied experience is not clear. In
the déjà vu study example discussed earlier with elevated response rates on control trials, the
researchers also asked an independent group to define déjà vu and the majority defined it
merely as familiarity [9]. Only 6 of the 92 participants gave the operational definition used by
the researchers (a sense of familiarity combined with the awareness that it is false). The same
question being interpreted differently by the experimenter and the participants is obviously
problematic [12].
In the four experiments presented here, we investigated participants’ reports of déjà vu and
TOT on a task that we have no reason to hypothesise induces either experience: continuous
recognition. The absence of a critical experimental manipulation for the generation of either
experience (i.e. conditions under which we were hypothesising déjà vu or TOT would be gener-
ated) allowed us to establish conditions uncontaminated by residual effects of successful expe-
rience generation–conditions which empirical déjà vu and TOT researchers are attempting to
attain during baseline/control experience assessment. In Experiment 1 we manipulated the
number of times participants were asked about déjà vu or TOT to establish whether report
rates show a relationship with question frequency. In Experiments 2A and 2B we assessed
whether the high report rates from Experiment 1 decreased in participants who were asked to
bring to mind a previous ‘real-life’ experience of déjà vu or TOT prior to completing the task.
In Experiment 3 we explored whether déjà vu and TOT reporting changes with the method of
questioning used–instead of asking participants at regular intervals whether they had the given
experience (retrospective report), participants were required to indicate with a button press
whenever it occurred (free report). Finally, in Experiment 4 we investigated whether partici-
pants’ reports changed with manipulation of the definition and the name given to the experi-
ence. Together, these manipulations allowed us to explore whether déjà vu and TOT false
alarms could arise (i) due to demand characteristics and acquiescence or (ii) lack of clarity of
terms and agreement on their meaning.
Experiment 1
We investigated, between-subjects, whether repeatedly questioning participants about a subjec-
tive experience of déjà vu or TOT increased reporting of these experiences. After completing a
continuous recognition task, all participants were asked whether they experienced déjà vu,
experienced TOT or saw any words presented in yellow (no words were presented in yellow)
during the experiment. These post-experimental reports were the main variable of interest.
There were four experimental conditions instantiated prior to this retrospective assessment of
experimental experience. In the first condition, participants were asked about their experience
of déjà vu periodically during the continuous recognition task (Déjà vu condition). In the sec-
ond and third conditions, participants received similar questioning about the occurrence of
TOT (TOT condition) and words presented in the colour yellow (Colour condition). In the
fourth condition, the recognition task was uninterrupted (Control condition). We thus
explored how the frequency of various reports changed in groups of participants who were
asked (i) only once on completing the task (ii) repeatedly during the task and on completing
the task.
Method
Materials. For each participant, a different set of words was randomly selected from a pool
of 2000 singular, common English nouns from the English Lexicon Project (minimum log
Hyperspace Analogue to Language frequency 8.02) [13]. Each word was presented in a colour
selected at random from the options black, green, red, blue or purple (no words were presented
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in yellow). The study was coded in JavaScript for participants to complete via an Internet
browser on their Internet-enabled device.
Participants. Data were collected for 224 participants (56 in each condition). The partici-
pants were 94 men and 128 women (2 did not disclose gender) with mean age of 27.8
(SD = 9.4; 6 did not disclose age). This was an Internet based study, advertised as a memory
experiment, and participants were recruited via links to the experiment on (i) the last author’s
lab website, (ii) websites advertising online psychology experiments (e.g. Psychological
Research on the Net) and (iii) social networking sites (e.g. Twitter and Facebook). The collected
data was anonymised and stored under numerical ID not associated with identifying informa-
tion. Participants were not given any compensation but memory performance feedback was
provided in the form of a breakdown of their memory performance at the end of the study. All
subsequent experiments used the same procedure for recruiting participants. Ethical approval
for all experiments reported in this paper was granted by the University Teaching and Research
Ethics Committee, University of St Andrews (Approval PS8815).
Procedure. Participants first completed a consent form and were asked to provide demo-
graphic information. They were then randomly assigned to one of four conditions. All partici-
pants completed a continuous recognition task in which 120 items were serially presented.
These items consisted of 80 words, 40 of which were presented once and 40 of which were pre-
sented twice (repeats). Of the 40 repeats, 10 were presented with a lag of four items, 10 with a
lag of eight items, 10 with a lag of 16 items and 10 with a lag of 32 items. For each item, partici-
pants made an old/new decision using the mouse.
In the Control condition, participants always proceeded directly to the next trial. In the
other three conditions, every 12 trials participants were asked whether they experienced déjà
vu, TOT or whether they saw any words presented in yellow (9 times throughout the experi-
ment). After the first question they were instructed to answer only for the period since they
were last asked.
In the Déjà vu condition, participants were given a standard definition of déjà vu: “Déjà vu
is a feeling of familiarity with a situation (e.g. seeing a word) combined with an awareness that
this familiarity is inappropriate (i.e. you know you have not experienced the situation before”. In
the TOT condition they were similarly provided with a definition of TOT: “The tip-of-the-ton-
gue sensation is the failure to bring a word to mind, combined with partial recall of some of its
characteristics (e.g. the starting letter) and the feeling that you will bring it to mind soon”.
At the end of the recognition task, participants in all conditions completed the same post-
experimental questionnaire (PEQ). They were given a definition of déjà vu and TOT (as above)
and were asked to indicate (yes or no) to three questions: whether they experienced déjà vu,
TOT and seeing a word presented in yellow at any point during the experiment.
Example participant experience: A participant assigned to the Déjà vu condition would, at
the beginning of the experiment, be given a definition of déjà vu and told she would be asked
periodically to report her experience of it during the experiment. Every time she completed 12
trials of the continuous recognition task, she would be asked whether she experienced déjà vu
since last asked. On completion of the experiment, she would then be asked whether, at any
point during the experiment, she experienced déjà vu, whether she experienced TOT, and
whether she saw any words presented in yellow. All questions received a yes/no answer.
Results and Discussion
Memory performance. To establish whether recognition task performance was equivalent
across conditions, sensitivity (d') and bias (c) measures were computed (see Table 1). In calcu-
lating Hit and False Alarm rates we used a correction proposed by Snodgrass and Corwin to
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deal with errorless responding [14]. A one-way ANOVA revealed that groups neither differed
in their sensitivity, F< 1, nor in their bias, F(3,223) = 1.99, p = .12, η p
2 = .026.
Post-experimental reports of déjà vu and TOT. The principal question addressed was
whether the groups differed in the percentage of déjà vu and TOT reporters. In other words,
we asked whether participants were more likely to report experiencing déjà vu or TOT when
asked about the experience repeatedly throughout the recognition task (Déjà vu or TOT condi-
tion) as compared to only once following the recognition task (the other 3 conditions, see Fig
1). Overall, a third to a half of participants in each group reported experiences of déjà vu and
TOT. There were no differences between groups in the percentage of participants reporting
déjà vu, χ2(3) = 1.79, p = .62. However, groups did differ in their reports of TOT, χ2(3) = 8.99,
p< .05. Pair-wise comparisons, using the Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons,
confirmed that more participants reported experiencing TOT in the TOT group as compared
to the Control and the Colour group (ps< .05) but not the Déjà vu group (p = .069).
Within-experiment reports of déjà vu and TOT. To further examine whether reports
changed with the frequency of questioning, we analysed whether the likelihood of a within-
experiment déjà vu or TOT report increased with the number of times participants were asked.
Of the 9 times that participants could report an experience during the study we compared the
frequency of reports for the first 3 times they were asked (i.e. the first section of the recognition
task) against the intermediate and the last 3 questions. The following analyses concern only
those participants who reported the given experiences in the PEQ i.e. déjà vu reporters in the
Déjà vu condition and TOT reporters in the TOT condition (see Table 2). While we did not
observe any difference in déjà vu reports between the three sections, F(2,58) = 2.78, p = .071,
η p
2 = .087, there was a difference in TOT reports, F(2,62) = 3.87, p< .05, η p
2 = .11. Post-hoc
tests using the Bonferroni correction showed that, TOT reports were less frequent in the first
as compared to the third section (p< .01), neither of which differed from frequency of reports
in the second section (ps> .29).
Summary. Consistent with our predictions, we observed an increase of TOT reporting in
the TOT group as compared to the Control and Colour groups and we also observed an
increase in frequency of TOT reports across the recognition task with more reports toward the
end than the beginning of the experiment. This pattern of results was not observed for déjà vu.
An unexpected finding is that even in the Control condition, a large percentage of participants
Table 1. Recognition task Sensitivity and Bias for Experiments 1 to 4.
Experiment Condition Sensitivity (d') Bias (c)
Experiment 1 Déjà vu 2.84 (.82) .30 (.48)
TOT 2.66 (.91) .14 (.47)
Colour 2.83 (.68) .19 (.47)
Control 2.76 (.83) .32 (.41)
Experiment 2A Déjà vu 2.92 (.60) .18 (.36)
TOT 2.74 (.82) .24 (.40)
Experiment 2B Déjà vu 2.57 (.92) .37 (.46)
TOT 2.82 (.87) .16 (.52)
Experiment 3 Déjà vu 2.87 (.87) .23 (.34)
TOT 2.89 (.67) .17 (.30)
Experiment 4 Paramnesia 3.02 (.67) .14 (.32)
Unpleasant Familiarity 2.99 (.54) .23 (.38)
Means are shown, with standard deviations in parentheses.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0154334.t001
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reported experiencing déjà vu (41.1%) and TOT (33.9%) suggesting a general tendency to
report these experiences in the continuous recognition task. The colour reports provided a use-
ful estimate for yes responding that could result from lack of attention or uncertainty about the
occurrence of a phenomenon not attended to during the recognition task; they were far below
the reporting observed for déjà vu and TOT. One possibility is that providing déjà vu and TOT
definitions to participants does not provide adequate clarity to ensure sufficient understanding
of the experience in question. Thus, in a second experiment we checked for understanding of
the terms by drawing a comparison with ‘real world’ versions of the experiences.
Experiments 2A and 2B
Given the high frequency of déjà vu and TOT reports in Experiment 1, Experiments 2A and 2B
explored whether this could be due to a lack of understanding of the terms investigated, or a
shift in their meaning from the real world to the laboratory. We assessed whether the frequency
of déjà vu and TOT reports would change from what was observed in Experiment 1 if partici-
pants were first asked to recall a real-life, personal experience of the sensation. The aim was to
make the queried experience more salient to participants while they were completing the task.
Experiment 2A and 2B used Déjà vu and TOT conditions analogous to those used in Exper-
iment 1, with two key changes. In Experiment 2A, participants simply brought to mind and
Fig 1. Percentage of participants reporting déjà vu, TOT and seeing yellow words in the PEQ in Experiment 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0154334.g001
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described a prior, real-life experience of déjà vu or TOT before completing the recognition
task. In Experiment 2B, participants used this memory of a past experience as a reference when
assessing the experimentally-generated occurrence of the experience in question. Experiment
2B thus constituted a stronger version of the manipulation in Experiment 2A. In Experiment
2B, participants also provided subjective ratings of emotionality, intensity and salience for both
their real-life and experimentally-generated experiences of déjà vu and TOT. We thus investi-
gated whether participants perceive what they report experiencing in the experiment as differ-
ent to the real-life experience.
Method
Participants. There were 146 participants in Experiment 2A (73 in each condition). They
were 97 women, 47 men (2 did not disclose gender), mean age = 26.9 (SD = 9.3; 3 did not dis-
close age). As described in the Results, in Experiment 2A over 50% of participants did not write
down a real-life experience of déjà vu or TOT when prompted to at the instructions stage. We
purposefully did not force participants to respond to questions so as to avoid false reporting.
However, this particular lack of compliance with instructions made it difficult to evaluate the
effectiveness of our manipulation; without participants describing any experience we could not
be sure they brought it to mind. As a result, in Experiment 2B we narrowed down criteria for
data collection. While participants could still complete the entire study without answering any
questions, data was collected only for participants who completed the subjective ratings of real-
life déjà vu or TOT experiences during the instructions stage (described below). Data was col-
lected for 127 participants (60 in the Déjà vu condition and 67 in the TOT condition), 88
female, 39 male, mean age = 30.1 (SD = 13.2, 2 did not disclose age).
Materials and procedure. The materials used were the same as in Experiment 1. As
before, participants completed a continuous recognition task and after every 12 trials they were
asked to indicate whether, during those 12 trials, they experienced déjà vu or TOT (Déjà vu
and TOT conditions respectively). After completing the recognition task, all participants indi-
cated in the PEQ whether they experienced déjà vu, TOT or saw any words presented in yellow
(none were) at any point during the experiment.
In Experiment 2A, prior to the continuous recognition task, participants were asked to
bring to mind a real-life experience of déjà vu or TOT (depending on condition) and provide a
written account of this experience. In Experiment 2B, participants similarly described a past
Table 2. Within-experiment reports of déjà vu (in Déjà vu conditions) and TOT (in TOT conditions) by Experiment.
Condition Experiment 1st section 2nd section 3rd section Total
Déjà vu Exp.1 1.53 (0.94) 1.87 (1.07) 1.73 (1.17) 5.13 (2.90)
Exp. 2A 1.27 (1.04) 1.61 (1.20) 1.58 (1.25) 4.46 (3.09)
Exp. 2B 1.53 (0.97) 2.10 (1.12) 1.73 (1.17) 5.36 (2.57)
Exp. 3 0.38 (0.59) 0.48 (0.81) 0.86 (1.28) 1.71 (2.10)
TOT Exp. 1 1.06 (0.91) 1.44 (1.19) 1.66 (1.18) 4.16 (2.54)
Exp. 2A 1.00 (0.89) 1.42 (1.16) 1.58 (1.02) 4.00 (2.41)
Exp. 2B 0.84 (0.99) 1.38 (1.09) 1.32 (1.08) 3.54 (2.52)
Exp. 3 0.30 (0.54) 0.56 (0.84) 0.30 (0.61) 1.15 (1.23)
Paramnesia Exp. 4 0.74 (0.94) 0.77 (0.99) 0.61 (1.15) 2.13 (2.50)
Unpleasant Familiarity Exp. 4 0.40 (0.99) 0.80 (1.58) 0.35 (0.68) 1.55 (2.76)
Mean numbers of within-experiment reports (by section of the recognition task and total) are given for participants who reported the given experience in
the PEQ. Standard deviations appear in parentheses.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0154334.t002
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experience of déjà vu or TOT and additionally, rated its salience, intensity and emotionality
with each rating made on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 5 (very). Participants in Experiment 2B
were instructed to use the described, real-life experience as a point of reference for assessment
of any experimentally-generated experiences. All participants who reported déjà vu or TOT in
the PEQ further rated this experimentally-generated experience on salience, intensity and
emotionality.
Results and Discussion
Real-life déjà vu and TOT descriptions. In Experiment 2A, 58.9% participants in both
the TOT condition and the Déjà vu condition did not provide any real world description, stated
they could not think of any one particular instance, or indicated that it happens fairly often
without elaborating. In Experiment 2B, these unelaborated responses reduced to 15.3% in the
Déjà vu and 11.9% in the TOT conditions due to the substantial decrease in participants who
left the question unanswered. Two participants in Experiment 2A and one participant in 2B
described what they termed déjà vu-like experiences rather than an actual occurrence of déjà
vu. In Experiment 2A there were two participants and in Experiment 2B one participant who
reported never having experienced déjà vu. We did not exclude these participants from the fol-
lowing analyses, as we did not have a way of checking whether this could also be true of partici-
pants in Experiment 1, against whom we were comparing the data.
Memory performance. As in Experiment 1, we compared memory performance between
the Déjà vu and TOT groups (see Table 1). In Experiment 2A, there was no difference between
the TOT and Déjà vu conditions in sensitivity, t(144) = 1.54, p = .13, d = .25, or bias, t< 1. In
Experiment 2B, the two conditions likewise did not differ in sensitivity, t(125) = 1.57, p = .12,
d = .29, but there was a difference in bias, t(125) = 2.36, p< .05, d = .43, with participants more
liberal (more likely to label an item as old) in the TOT as compared to the Déjà vu condition.
Post-experimental reports of déjà vu and TOT. Our primary aim was to see whether the
comparison with real-life experiences would influence the percentage of participants reporting
subjective experiences. We compared déjà vu reports in the Déjà vu conditions of Experiment
2A and 2B with déjà vu reports in the Déjà vu condition of Experiment 1. We likewise com-
pared TOT reports between the TOT groups of Experiment 1, 2A and 2B (see Fig 2). χ2 tests
revealed that the percentage of déjà vu and TOT reporters across the three groups did not differ
(ps> .63).
Within-experiment reports of déjà vu and TOT. While the percentage of participants
reporting déjà vu and TOT in Experiments 2A and 2B was not different from Experiment 1, it
is possible that the total number of experiences reported by these participants was reduced.
Amongst participants who post-experimentally reported experiencing déjà vu or TOT, we ana-
lysed how many times they reported the given experience during the experiment (see Table 2).
A between-subjects ANOVA revealed there was no difference in the total number of déjà vu
reports for participants in the Déjà vu conditions of Experiment 1, 2A and 2B, F< 1. The same
analysis on the number of TOT reports across the TOT groups in Experiments 1, 2A and 2B
likewise revealed no significant difference, F< 1.
To confirm results of Experiment 1, we analysed whether, of the 9 times they were asked,
participants were less likely to report an experience in the first section (on questions 1–3) as
compared to the second (questions 4–6) or third (questions 7–9) section of the recognition
task. While reporting did not differ across the three sections in the Déjà vu condition of Experi-
ment 2A, F(2,64) = 2.53, p = .09, η p
2 = .073, there was a difference in the TOT condition of
Experiment 2A, F(2,70) = 5.23, p< .01, η p
2 = .13. Post-hoc analysis using the Bonferroni cor-
rection confirmed this difference was due to reports being more frequent in the third as
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compared to the first section (p< .01) whereas there was no difference between the first and
second section (p = .09). A similar result was observed for the TOT condition of Experiment
2B, F(2,72) = 5.44, p< .01, η p
2 = .13, with fewer reports in the first section as compared to the
second and third (ps< .05) sections. In Experiment 2B there was also a difference in déjà vu
reports, F(2,58) = 3.56, p< .05, η p
2 = .11. However, this consisted of more reports in the sec-
ond as compared to the first section (p< .05) with no difference between the first and third
sections (p = 1.0). Across all groups, there were no differences in reporting between the second
and the third section (ps> .23). Overall, the increase in number of TOT reports with the
increase in number of times participants were queried about the experience mimics the results
of Experiment 1 and lends support to the original finding that the frequency of questioning can
impact reports of subjective memory experiences.
Phenomenological characteristics of real-life vs. experimentally-generated experi-
ences. Lastly, we explored whether participants perceived the experimentally-generated expe-
riences as subjectively different to their real-life experiences. To this end we compared the
ratings of salience, intensity and emotionality between reports of real-life and experimentally-
generated experiences of déjà vu and TOT in Experiment 2B (see Fig 3). Context (real, experi-
mental) x dimension (salience, intensity, emotionality) repeated measures ANOVAs were used
to analyse both déjà vu and TOT reports. For déjà vu reports, there was a main effect of
Fig 2. Percentage of participants reporting déjà vu and TOT in the PEQ in Experiments 1, 2A and 2B. Déjà vu reports are from Déjà vu conditions and
TOT reports are from TOT conditions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0154334.g002
Déjà Vu and Tip-of-the-Tongue Reports
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0154334 April 21, 2016 9 / 18
context, meaning real-life déjà vu experiences were rated higher on all dimensions as compared
to experimentally-generated déjà vu, F(1,28) = 16.17, p< .001, η p
2 = .37. There was also a
main effect of dimension, F(2,56) = 3.56, p< .05, η p
2 = .11, suggesting some scales received,
overall, higher ratings. TOT reports followed the same pattern with real-life experiences rated
higher than experimentally-generated experiences on all dimensions, F(1,35) = 55.23, p< .001,
η p
2 = .61, and with a main effect of dimension, F(2,70) = 27.68, p< .001, η p
2 = .44, meaning
the scales differed on how high participants scored them overall.
We also checked whether the ratings of experimentally-generated experiences differed sig-
nificantly from 1 (the lowest possible rating) using a one-sample t-test. This was so as to con-
firm whether these experiences were rated as having any of the three phenomenological
characteristics or whether participants simply scored them as phenomenologically neutral.
This was confirmed for all ratings (salience, intensity and emotionality) for both déjà vu and
TOT (all p-values< .001, lowest t-value = 3.86).
Summary. Asking participants to bring to mind a real-life experience of déjà vu or TOT
did not attenuate unexpectedly high reports of their occurrence during the experiment. We
replicated a result of Experiment 1 showing an increase in TOT reporting in the third as com-
pared to the first section of the recognition task with no such result observed for déjà vu report-
ing. Despite the high percentage of both déjà vu and TOT reporters, it is clear that participants
perceived experimentally-generated déjà vu and TOT experiences as at least subjectively
weaker as compared to their experiences in real-life as revealed by their salience, emotionality
and intensity ratings.
Fig 3. Ratings of experience characteristics across context. Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0154334.g003
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These results suggest that the high frequencies of déjà vu and TOT observed in Experiment
1 are likely not due to a lack of clarity about the experiences queried and so might alternatively
be linked to the method of questioning employed. More specifically, participants might be led
to re-interpret their actual experiences as those they are asked about. We addressed this in
Experiment 3 by substituting periodic retrospective questioning for a free report of déjà vu or
TOT occurrence, which participants were able to make whenever the experiences occurred.
Experiment 3
In this experiment we tested whether a different method of questioning would reduce the levels
of déjà vu and TOT reported during and after the continuous recognition procedure. In the
previous experiments, participants were asked at regular intervals whether they experienced
déjà vu or TOT. In this experiment we replaced this recurring question with a button present
throughout the entire recognition task, which participants were instructed to press whenever
they experienced déjà vu or TOT (depending on their condition). As such we turned from
repeatedly assessing retrospectively whether a participant had a déjà vu or a TOT experience to
a free, real-time report assessment of when such an experience occurred. This method of expe-
rience assessment would not inevitably reduce responding—it actually provided participants
with unlimited opportunity to report the experiences in question (as compared to only being
asked 9 times). However, we hypothesised that it should place less pressure on participants
toward acquiescence and so lead to a reduction of reports. We thus again repeated the déjà vu
and TOT conditions of Experiment 1 with this novel method of querying déjà vu and TOT
occurrence. Data from the déjà vu and TOT groups of Experiment 1 once more formed the
baseline against which we compared the results of this manipulation.
Method
Participants. A total of 123 participants took part in this experiment, 64 in the Déjà vu
condition and 59 in the TOT condition. 41 were women, 76 were men (6 did not disclose their
gender) with mean age of 28.9 (SD = 8.8; 7 did not disclose age).
Materials and procedure. The materials were the same as in Experiment 1. The procedure
replicated that of the Déjà vu and TOT conditions in Experiment 1 with one change during the
recognition task. Instead of being asked every 12 trials (9 times in total) whether participants
experienced déjà vu or TOT, they were presented with a button, onscreen throughout the con-
tinuous recognition task, which they could press whenever they had the given experience. At
the end of the recognition task, all participants completed the PEQ where they indicated
whether at any point during the experiment they experienced déjà vu, TOT or saw any words
presented in yellow.
Results and Discussion
Memory performance. To check consistency of performance between groups we again
compared sensitivity and bias scores (see Table 1). An independent samples t-test revealed that
the Déjà vu and TOT groups did not differ on either measure, demonstrating equivalent mem-
ory performance on the recognition task in both sensitivity, t< 1, and bias, t(121) = 1.05, p =
.30, d = .19.
Post-experimental reports of déjà vu and TOT
To analyse whether our manipulation had an effect on the percentage of participants reporting
déjà vu and TOT experiences we compared déjà vu and TOT reports in this experiment against
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Déjà vu and TOT reports in the equivalent conditions in Experiment 1 (see Fig 4). There were
fewer participants post-experimentally reporting déjà vu in Experiment 3 as compared to
Experiment 1, χ2(1) = 5.27, p< .05. There was no difference in TOT reports however, χ2(1) =
1.49, p = .22.
Within-experiment reports of déjà vu and TOT. For those participants who post-experi-
mentally reported experiencing déjà vu or TOT, we examined how many times they reported
the given experience during the experiment (see Table 2). More specifically, we analysed
whether participants in Experiment 3 reported fewer occurrences of déjà vu and TOT than par-
ticipants in Experiment 1 during the recognition task. An independent samples t-test revealed
that participants in the Déjà vu condition of Experiment 1 reported fewer déjà vu experiences
during the recognition task than participants in the Déjà vu condition of Experiment 3, t(49) =
4.62, p< .001, d = 1.34. An equivalent analysis of the number of TOT reports also revealed a
significant reduction in Experiment 3, t(57) = 5.61, p< .001, d = 1.49.
Summary. The free report method of questioning decreased the percentage of participants
reporting déjà vu but not TOT relative to Experiment 1. For those participants who post-exper-
imentally reported déjà vu or TOT, we observed a significant decrease in the number of
instances of both déjà vu and TOT reported. This is notable as participants here had the oppor-
tunity to reportmore experiences than in previous experiments. This shows that using a free
Fig 4. Percentage of participants reporting déjà vu and TOT in the PEQ in Experiments 1 and 3. Déjà vu reports are from Déjà vu conditions and TOT
reports are from TOT conditions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0154334.g004
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report, self-reflective method of questioning, where the participant is asked to continually
monitor her subjective state rather than having to retrospectively assess whether an event
occurred, may place less pressure on participants toward positive responding. However, the
high percentage of participants reporting the sensation post-experimentally still begs the ques-
tion: what are participants experiencing when they report déjà vu in a standard memory proce-
dure? In Experiment 4, we attempted to capture qualities of the experience most likely to be
endorsed by participants. To this end we compared the independent contributions of (i) the
term déjà vu and (ii) the operational definition associated with it to subsequent reports of its
occurrence.
Experiment 4
In Experiment 4 we looked at déjà vu reports exclusively. This decision was driven by the flexibil-
ity that exists in defining the experience, especially in lay use of the term [15,16]. In the Paramne-
sia condition, we gave participants the same definition of déjà vu as in previous studies but
replaced the label “déjà vu”, which the explanation defined, with “paramnesia”. In the Unpleasant
familiarity condition, we kept the label “déjà vu” but only defined the idea of unpleasant familiar-
ity in the explanation (an accepted secondary use of déjà vu in every-day language as confirmed
by Merriam-Webster dictionary) [17]. The Paramnesia condition assessed whether it is the defi-
nition alone that participants endorse when reporting déjà vu in these experiments. If this is the
case, the percentage of reporters should stay the same even without reference to the term “déjà
vu”. The Unpleasant familiarity condition assessed whether participants are indicating the expe-
rience of mundane familiarity when reporting déjà vu. Across both conditions, the PEQ déjà vu
question was kept the same as in previous experiments. We used the same method of questioning
as in Experiment 3, favouring free over retrospective reporting. As such we used the déjà vu
group of Experiment 3 as the baseline against which we compared results from this experiment.
In line with the idea that continuous recognition should generate feelings of familiarity, but
should be less likely to generate déjà vu, we predicted that we would see more reports of déjà vu
in the Unpleasant familiarity rather than the Paramnesia condition.
Method
Participants. 154 participants took part in this study, 78 in the Paramnesia and 76 in the
Unpleasant familiarity group. 77 were women and 77 men, mean age 24.6 (SD = 7.0; 3 did not
disclose age).
Materials and procedure. The procedure was a modification of the Déjà vu condition in
Experiment 3. In the Paramnesia condition, participants were given the same déjà vu definition as
before but this time labelled as paramnesia: Paramnesia is a feeling of familiarity with a situation
(e.g. seeing a word) combined with an awareness that this familiarity is inappropriate (i.e. you know
you have not experienced the situation before). The Unpleasant familiarity condition kept the label
‘déjà vu’ but provided an alternative definition: Déjà vu is the feeling that a situation (e.g. seeing a
word) is overly or unpleasantly familiar. As in Experiment 3, participants were told to press a but-
ton during the recognition task whenever they experienced the subjective state described in the
instructions. At the end of the continuous recognition task, they indicated whether they experi-
enced déjà vu, TOT or saw any words presented in yellow at any point in the experiment.
Results and Discussion
Memory performance. As in previous experiments, we first analysed whether participants
in the two conditions performed the same on the recognition task (see Table 1). The two
groups did not differ in either sensitivity, t< 1, or bias, t(152) = 1.60, p = .11, d = .26.
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Post-experimental reports of déjà vu and TOT. To analyse whether the manipulation
had an effect on reporting, we first compared the percentage of post-experimental déjà vu reports
across the two groups and the Experiment 3 déjà vu group. The percentage of déjà vu reporters
in Experiment 3 (32.8%) did not differ significantly from that reported in the Paramnesia or
Unpleasant familiarity conditions (39.7% and 26.3% respectively), χ2(2) = 3.14, p = .21.
Within-experiment reports of déjà vu and TOT. We also analysed whether the groups
differed in how many experiences participants reported on average during the recognition task.
For those who reported déjà vu in the PEQ, the number of experiences reported during the rec-
ognition task did not differ between the Paramnesia and Unpleasant familiarity conditions and
Déjà vu condition of Experiment 3 (see Table 2), F< 1.
Summary. The lack of difference in déjà vu reports between the Paramnesia condition
here and Experiment 3 could suggest that participants were in fact endorsing the déjà vu defini-
tion offered to them in their subjective reports, regardless of the label. However, the corre-
sponding absence of a difference across the Unpleasant familiarity condition and Experiment 3
suggests that participants were equally likely to report déjà vu when it was equated with famil-
iarity as when it was equated with the standard definition used in experimental settings. Over-
all, these results reinforce the idea that participants are less sensitive to what they are being
asked as compared to how they are being asked, as manipulated in Experiment 3.
General Discussion
The subjective nature of déjà vu and TOT means that researchers of these experiences must
rely on subjective self-reports. We have no observable identifier or behavioural index of
whether the experiences have occurred–an issue as true for behavioural testing as for neurolog-
ical case studies or surveys of real-life occurrence. As experimenters however, we do have con-
trol over how we elicit these self-reports and as such it is crucial to fully appreciate whether our
methods influence participant responding (see [2]). Déjà vu and TOT are distinct experiences
with unique underlying mechanisms (for reviews see [1,15]) and the methodologies employed
for their assessment have therefore developed largely independently of each other. We are not
the first to argue that current methods could be improved. It has previously been suggested
that déjà vu research should borrow from the procedures used to study TOT, primarily by
moving from purely PEQ type reports to trial-level reports [18]. We would argue that a useful
parity can be found in TOT research borrowing from practices common in déjà vu research,
especially the use of control trials to monitor baseline reporting. All of these concerns are part
of a wider, ongoing debate concerning the best practices in the study of all subjective experi-
ences and consciousness. Despite attempts to find objective, no-report measures, self-report
remains a crucial tool to assessing inherently first-order, introspective experiences [19]. The
purpose of the current study was to establish the extent to which both TOT and déjà vu self-
reports are sensitive to the way they are queried with the aim of adding to this debate.
Experiment 1 was designed to assess whether repeated questioning leads to inflated reports
of déjà vu and TOT. We expected to find differences in post-experimental responses based on
the questions participants were asked during the recognition task. In fact, we found high per-
centage of déjà vu and TOT reporters no matter the condition. These high levels of déjà vu and
TOT reporting are implausible given the absence of any manipulation that could have gener-
ated déjà vu or TOT, so in subsequent experiments we attempted to find methods by which
déjà vu and TOT reports could be reduced to acceptable levels in the context of no experience
having been generated. We used comparisons with real world experiences (Experiments 2A
and 2B), changes in the within-experiment questioning method from retrospective to free-
report (Experiment 3) and changes in the definition of déjà vu (Experiment 4). Across all
Déjà Vu and Tip-of-the-Tongue Reports
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0154334 April 21, 2016 14 / 18
experiments, we found unexpectedly high percentage of participants reporting déjà vu and
TOT in the PEQ. First we discuss the effects of our manipulations on déjà vu and TOT reports.
Next we consider how these elevated false alarms may have come about. Lastly we make rec-
ommendations for future research based on the current results.
We found some evidence that the method of questioning used to assess subjective memory
experiences is enough to change the percentage of participants reporting its occurrence. In
Experiment 1 we observed that, with repeated questioning, more participants reported
experiencing TOT in the PEQ than in the other groups. Across experiments that employed the
repeated questioning methodology (Experiments 1, 2A and 2B), TOT reports were also more
frequent toward the end of the recognition task, after repeated questioning, as compared to the
beginning. Further, instructing participants to indicate whenever they experienced déjà vu
(Experiment 3) as compared to being repeatedly asked whether it occurred (Experiment 1)
reduced the reported number of occurrences of déjà vu and TOT during the experiment and
the percentage of participants reporting déjà vu in the PEQ. It is notable that the free report
method, which actually allowed participants to report more instances of a given experience, led
to fewer reports than the more established retrospective method. In contrast, our manipula-
tions at the instructions stage (Experiments 2A, 2B and 4) had no impact on frequency of
reports and percentage of reporters. The results described above suggest research on subjective
experiences is more likely to suffer from acquiescence effects rather than lack of agreement or
understanding by participants of the experiences under study.
The consistency of reporting across the four experiments has the potential to encourage
confidence in déjà vu and TOT self-reports; it could be argued that self-report in the context of
research on subjective experiences is a reliable method. Nevertheless, as we stated in the Intro-
duction, the motivation for this paper came from research showing participants report subjec-
tive experiences on control trials which were not meant to induce them and which current
theory struggles to account for (e.g. [9]). Further, there is clear evidence that participant’s
reports are sensitive to task instructions [8] and that participants freely retract experiences
reported during study merely when asked to elaborate on their nature [10]. In light of this, the
issue of whether consistent self-reports equate to valid self-reports remains.
One interpretation of our findings is that continuous recognition tasks do generate déjà vu
and TOT. When participants are presented with common nouns on the recognition task, the
general familiarity with a word combined with its ‘new’ status on the recognition task could be
experienced as déjà vu like. However, this would imply that the simple act of monitoring the
new vs. old status of stimuli is enough to generate the experience. Given the frequent occur-
rence of such monitoring, both in navigating everyday situations and as a basic requirement in
many cognitive tasks, one must conclude that déjà vu should occur very commonly in natural-
istic settings and in the multitude of recognition experiments carried out every year. By all
accounts this does not seem to be the case. Similarly, one could suggest that seeing a word
might have motivated participants to attempt recall of information related to it, which could
result in a TOT experience for that word when the retrieval failed. However, in a context where
participants are merely asked to indicate whether a word has been seen already or is presented
for the first time, the possibility that participants are actively trying to retrieve information
about the presented words unrelated to the task at hand and then experience TOTs for this
information at the rate that we have observed remains highly unlikely. While we readily
acknowledge that some participants might have had some such experiences, these would not
have been generated by our manipulations and we do not believe they could have been pro-
duced at the frequency that we observed across the four experiments reported here.
As stated previously, the purpose of using the continuous recognition paradigm was that it
was not expected to generate either déjà vu or TOT experiences. The argument made here is
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not that an elevated report of subjective experiences in experimental settings is problematic. If
a manipulation for successful déjà vu or TOT generation has been discovered, then such an ele-
vation is to be expected [18]. We do however believe that we should be wary of paradigms that
fail to differentiate between different types of subjective experiences such as familiarity without
recollection (as in when somebody seems familiar but we cannot remember where we know
them from; see [20]), déjà vu and TOT. Rather than concluding that perhaps this means these
experiences are in fact identical, we should ask first why participants might seemingly be con-
flating them.
We propose that the explanation for the current data is some combination of demand char-
acteristics [5] and the inferential nature of subjective experiences [21]. The current view is that
people interpret largely implicit cues (e.g. fluency of processing) in determining whether an
item is familiar [22] or whether they are in a subjective mnemonic state such as TOT [21] and
that people might experience a degree of uncertainty as to what exactly they are experiencing
[23]. Additionally, a large body of literature has demonstrated that the way a question is framed
can bias memory reports in eye-witness situations [24], and classic memory [6] and metamem-
ory [25] tasks. If a participant is unsure of what she is experiencing and interprets being asked
about experiencing déjà vu or TOT as indicative that she should be experiencing déjà vu or
TOT, she may reinterpret her current state as that which she is asked about. This could lead to
reports of subjective experiences she is not experiencing. We propose that in making retrospec-
tive self-reports, participants are more likely to search for similarities between their actual
experience and that which they are asked about. In contrast, in free reports they might initially
set a criterion against which they judge whether an event has occurred, thus leaving less room
to reinterpret mundane experiences as the experience in question, and therefore produce false
alarms.
Another key question of interest is the relationship between real-life and experimentally-
generated subjective experiences. Experiment 2B demonstrated that participants perceive
whatever they are experiencing in the experiment as different to their experiences in real life.
Both déjà vu and TOT were rated as more salient, intense and emotional when experienced in
real-life than when experimentally-generated. Similarly, a study that compared naturally
occurring and laboratory reported TOTs in the same sample found little to no relationship
between the two with the incidence of laboratory TOTs (23 for young adults) far outnumbering
the number of naturally occurring TOTs experienced in a 4-week period (5.21 for young
adults) [26]. However, one study did find a moderately strong relationship between real-life
and experiment-generated experiences in young adults (with no such relationships for older
adults) [27] and in another study 90% of participants claimed their laboratory TOTs resemble
real-life TOTs [28]. The question of how real-life and experimentally-generated déjà vu com-
pare has only very recently come under scrutiny with data suggesting that naturalistic déjà vu
last longer and are more comprehensive (relating to whole scenarios and situations) than
experimentally-generated experiences (which tend to be stimulus specific) [10]. More data on
the nature of the similarities and differences would be useful.
As to how the presented experiments can inform future empirical work on déjà vu, TOT
and related phenomena, the clearest finding appears to be that false alarms may be best reduced
by letting participants report whenever the experiences occur, rather than periodically probing
them retrospectively. We suggest it is also helpful to include control trials and use participants’
reporting on these as an index of demand characteristics–a common practice in déjà vu
research but almost unheard of in TOT studies. Using methods which have been shown to
reduce false reporting and using indices which corroborate the effectiveness of such methods
will enable greater confidence in the data collected. Asking participants to relate the laboratory
induced experiences to their real-life experiences would be a great benefit to the field which
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frequently discusses this question but to date has done fairly little to collect data to address it.
Lastly, building on past research, a post-experimental questionnaire which asks participant to
indicate whether, or even how many times, they have experienced déjà vu or TOT during the
experiment is good practice and provides an opportunity to corroborate any reports gathered
during the experiment. We believe this approach could reduce the presence of false alarms
without necessarily promoting extreme conservatism in responding.
Researching experiences such as déjà vu and TOT remains an important endeavour for
memory researchers. That the metacognitive assessment of memory retrieval can conflict with
or dissociate from the output of that memory system has important implications for our under-
standing of memory and the higher order cognitive processes monitoring it. However, if partic-
ipants are confirming the occurrence of the subjective experiences a researcher asks them
about simply because they are being asked about them, researchers could inappropriately con-
clude that i) subjective phenomena are being reported when they are in fact not being experi-
enced; and ii) distinct phenomena such as déjà vu and TOT are manifestations of the same
experience. We need methodologies that can reliably tease apart the occurrence of these dis-
tinct experiences and that are less susceptible to influence by demand characteristics. Only
once these methods have been developed and refined will we reliably be able to study the causes
and mechanisms that underlie these curious and compelling mental phenomena.
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